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THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC STABILITY: COMPARING 
THE ELECTIONS OF 2016 AND 1860 
STUART CHINN 
In the wake of Donald Trump’s presidential victory this past November, 
many commentators discussed whether that electoral result could pose a fun-
damental threat to American democracy.  Given the prominent role of iden-
tity politics in that election, given the particular attributes and liabilities of 
both presidential candidates, and given the surprising conclusion to the elec-
tion, emotions unsurprisingly ran high in the immediate aftermath.  At least 
in my own interactions with students in the constitutional law class that I 
taught in the Fall 2016 term, I was struck by two types of reactions that had 
not appeared as prominently in my recollection of other recent, prior presi-
dential elections: first, there was a sense of deep personal loss, especially 
among those women who supported Hillary Clinton—the sense that this elec-
tion was not just a verdict on the two candidates, but a verdict in some sense 
upon these particular women as well.  Second, there was also a very personal 
and very concrete sense of threat among those students who fell within the 
constituencies that had garnered negative comments from Trump during the 
campaign. 
Assessing how great a threat President Trump poses to American de-
mocracy is a thorny task.  In the same manner as prior commentaries, how-
ever, I will undertake my own tentative examination of this question in this 
Essay.  My analysis will be through a comparative-historical lens: namely, 
by comparing the election of 2016 to the election of Lincoln in 1860.  The 
reference to the 1860 election for this inquiry is obvious enough: the victory 
by Lincoln did ultimately spark a fundamental challenge to the stability of 
American democracy in the form of southern secession and the Civil War.  
The basic aspiration of this comparative approach is to investigate whether 
some facets of the 1860 election may or may not find ready analogues in the 
present context and, accordingly, to draw implications from this comparison. 
Three qualifying notes should be stated from the onset regarding this 
comparative exercise: first, given that the full policy consequences of a 
Trump presidency remain unclear, my analysis of the 1860 election will 
largely focus on events and perceptions at a somewhat comparable stage.  
Hence, many of the policy shifts of the broader Civil War era are largely 
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ignored here.  Second, I have downplayed or largely bypassed examining or 
discussing those policy domains in the present time—such as the various con-
cerns surrounding a Trump foreign policy approach—that have no ready an-
alogue to events surrounding the 1860 election.  This is not to minimize their 
importance; it simply reflects the fact that this comparative analysis has rel-
atively little to say about those particular issues in the present.  Third, and 
finally, much of the analysis below proceeds by categorizing various argu-
ments and concerns present in both 1860 and 2016.  I would offer then the 
usual caveats about this type of exercise: while the items discussed below 
should make for a conventional set of topics, one can easily imagine another 
writer choosing to emphasize, add, or bypass certain topics.  Hopefully what 
I have compiled here will not strike many as far off-base. 
Below, I proceed by briefly discussing the contemplated policy shifts in 
both electoral contests.  I then discuss how the 2016 election may be seen to 
encompass the lesser threat to democratic stability when we focus on de-
mographics and the possibility of policy reversals.  However, I then note in 
the following section how there may be some tentative convergence between 
the 1860 and 2016 elections on a different dimension: the weakening or dis-
appearance of structures of commonality in American society in both con-
texts.  Finally, again prompted by the comparison with the 1860 election, I 
conclude by discussing how threats to American democracy might be mini-
mized in the present-time by a redrawing or reshuffling of the major fault 
lines of societal difference. 
I.  POLICY SHIFTS 
In the most obvious and basic sense, one might generally perceive a 
threat to the stability of American democracy from dramatic shifts in public 
policy toward undesirable ends.  Certainly such charges were made by South-
erners in the aftermath of the 1860 election and by anti-Trump voters in the 
weeks after the 2016 election.  In order to set the context for the discussion 
to follow, let me briefly recount some of the major contemplated policy shifts 
perceived by the losing constituencies in the immediate aftermath of these 
two presidential elections.  I acknowledge that it might seem rather perverse 
to compare Southerners in the Civil War era to progressive Democrats in the 
present-day.  But the comparison is superficially invoked here simply due to 
the fact that both constituencies lost in their respective presidential elections. 
With respect to the 1860 election, of course, the major policy shift in 
play was the elevation of anti-slavery principles in national political debate.  
The platform of the Republican Party ahead of the 1860 election, among other 
things, denounced secession and any efforts to restart the international slave 
trade.  While it conceded the right of the southern states to perpetuate a sys-
tem of slavery, the platform unambiguously opposed slavery in the territories, 
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and within its anti-slavery stance for the territories, the Platform encom-
passed an opposition to slavery based upon principle.1  Lincoln himself had 
notably registered his desire for the eventual extinction of slavery in his 
“House Divided” speech in 1858.  While he had also affirmed his disinclina-
tion to interfere with slavery in the southern states at that time, and while the 
scope of his desire for “ultimate extinction” was unclear then (and subse-
quently debated by scholars later on), Lincoln, like the Republican Party in 
the 1860 election, clearly endorsed a general principle of anti-slavery.2 
With respect to Trump, the focus has been on potential policy shifts that 
might very briefly and very roughly be grouped into two general categories.  
The first category involves domestic policy shifts that already have or may 
have some exclusionary consequences for various constituencies including 
Muslims and Muslim-Americans, racial minorities, immigrants, women, and 
the LGBT community.  Focusing in particular on immigrants3 and Mus-
lims/Muslim-Americans—since they were central parts of his presidential 
campaign—Trump very notably made the following comment in announcing 
his bid for the Republican presidential nomination in June 2015: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.  
They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you.  They’re send-
ing people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those 
problems with us.  They’re bringing drugs.  They’re bringing 
crime.  They’re rapists.  And some, I assume, are good people. 
 But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we’re getting.  
And it only makes common sense.  It only makes common sense.  
They’re sending us not the right people.4 
A few months later, Trump released a statement “calling for a total and com-
plete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”5  He stated the fol-
lowing in that press release: 
Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to any-
body the hatred is beyond comprehension.  Where this hatred 
                                                          
 1.  Republican Party Platform of 1860, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 17, 1860), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29620; see also DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING 
CRISIS 1848–1861, at 423 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976). 
 2.  DON E. FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS: LINCOLN IN THE 1850’S 74–78 (1962); 
see also POTTER, supra note 1, at 445. 
 3.  For an in-depth discussion of the parallels between Trump’s campaign rhetoric on immi-
gration and immigration policy debates surrounding Chinese Exclusion, see Stuart Chinn, Trump 
and Chinese Exclusion: Contemporary Parallels with Legislative Debates over the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 4.  Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-an-
nounces-a-presidential-bid/. 
 5.  Press Release, Donald J. Trump, Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 
2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=113841.  
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comes from and why we will have to determine.  Until we are able 
to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat 
it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks 
by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason 
or respect for human life.  If I win the election for President, we 
are going to Make America Great Again.6 
Within days of the beginning of his term, Trump followed up on this cam-
paign promise to a significant degree in suspending the entry of immigrants 
and nonimmigrants from seven majority-Muslim nations for at least ninety 
days, through executive order.7 
These comments, among many others, energized portions of the white 
electorate both within the Republican Party, and at the fringe of mainstream 
politics.8  Trump’s flirtation with racist and nativist themes was further high-
lighted by his association with Steve Bannon, of Breitbart, who assumed a 
role as advisor and strategist for Trump until his departure as Trump’s chief 
strategist in August 2017.9  President Trump’s nomination of Senator Jeff 
Sessions for Attorney General has fed into this theme.10  And beyond 
Trump’s own actions, fears of heightened societal discrimination during his 
                                                          
 6.  Id.; see also Russell Berman, Donald Trump’s Call to Ban Muslim Immigrants, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/donald-trumps-call-to-ban-
muslim-immigrants/419298/; Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Blaming Muslims After Attack, 
Donald Trump Tosses Pluralism Aside, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-speeches.html?_r=0; Dominic 
Tierney, Trump’s Unspeakable Strategy to Erase His Past, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/trumps-unspeakable-strategy-to-erase-his-
past/458748/. 
 7.  Trump’s Executive Order On Immigration, Annotated, NPR (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2017/01/31/512439121/trumps-executive-order-on-immigration-annotated; 
see also Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Trump’s Immigration Order Tests Limits of Law and Execu-
tive Power, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-
immigration-muslim-ban.html. 
 8.  Mark Leibovich, Donald Trump Is Not Going Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 29, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/magazine/donald-trump-is-not-going-anywhere.html 
(“Trump’s war on political correctness is especially pleasing to many of the white voters of the 
G.O.P. who feel usurped by newcomers and silenced by the progressive gains that women, Hispan-
ics and gays have enjoyed.”); Evan Osnos, The Fearful and the Frustrated, NEW YORKER (Aug. 31 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-fearful-and-the-frustrated; Robert L. 
Tsai, What Aryans See in Donald Trump, SLATE (May 26, 2016), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/05/what_aryans_see_in_donald_trump.html.   
 9.  Eric Lipton et al., Donald Trump’s Team Shows Few Signs of Post-Election Moderation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/politics/donald-trump-transi-
tion.html?_r=0; Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear & Glenn Thrush, Stephen Bannon Out at the 
White House After Turbulent Run, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/08/18/us/politics/steve-bannon-trump-white-house.html?_r=0. 
 10.  Matt Apuzzo, Specter of Race Shadows Jeff Sessions, Potential Trump Nominee for Cabi-
net, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/us/politics/specter-of-race-
shadows-jeff-sessions-potential-trump-nominee-for-cabinet.html?action=click&contentCollec-
tion=Politics&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. 
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presidency were crystallized by media attention on incidents of racism re-
ported on college campuses and beyond in the election’s aftermath.11  In this 
vein, the most notable incident thus far was the white nationalist and alt-right 
protests in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, that resulted in a num-
ber of clashes with counterprotesters and the death of one individual.12 
A second set of policy concerns that has garnered a great deal of com-
mentary, especially in the aftermath of the election, focuses on the fear that 
a Trump presidency will move the American polity to an undemocratic or 
even a fascist state.  Stated in brief, these concerns speak to the general anx-
iety or fear that President Trump may undermine core values, norms, or legal 
principles that constitute the foundation of American constitutional democ-
racy.13  More specific concerns emphasize the absence of sufficient respect 
by President Trump, up to this time, for norms of fair play and legitimate 
political opposition,14 his allegation of massive voter fraud in the general 
election,15 and his flouting of established and conventional norms with re-
spect to the press,16 financial conflicts of interest,17 and foreign relations18—
especially with respect to Russia and the hacking of Hillary Clinton’s 
emails.19 
                                                          
 11.  Caitlin Dickerson & Stephanie Saul, Campuses Confront Hostile Acts Against Minorities 
After Donald Trump’s Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/11/11/us/police-investigate-attacks-on-muslim-students-at-universities.html; Cait-
lin Dickerson, Reports of Bias-Based Attacks Tick Upward After Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/us/reports-of-bias-based-attacks-tick-upward-after-
election.html. 
 12.  Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-time-
line/?utm_term=.4ec90e19bff0. 
 13.  Turkuler Isiksel, Prepare For Regime Change, Not Policy Change, DISSENT (Nov. 13, 
2016), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/trump-victory-regime-change-lessons-autocrats-er-
dogan-putin. 
 14.  John Cassidy, Trump’s Challenge to American Democracy, NEW YORKER (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/trumps-challenge-to-american-democracy; Amy 
Davidson, Comment, Transitions, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2016, at 21; Steven Levitsky & Daniel 
Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-to-democracy.html; George 
Packer, Opinion, A Democratic Opposition, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 2016, at 48. 
 15.  Levitsky & Ziblatt, supra note 14; Michael Wines, All This Talk of Voter Fraud? Across 
U.S., Officials Found Next to None, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/18/us/voter-fraud.html. 
 16.  Cassidy, supra note 14; Hadas Gold, Journalists Fear for Their Profession Under Trump—
and Some, for Their Safety, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-
media/2016/11/the-media-fears-231138. 
 17.  Davidson, supra note 14. 
 18.  Max Fisher, Uncertainty over Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Risks Global Instability, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/world/americas/donald-trump-
foreign-policy.html. 
 19.  Paul Krugman, Opinion, How Republics End, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/19/opinion/how-republics-end.html; Levitsky & Ziblatt, supra note 14; Ashley 
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II.  ELECTORAL LOSERS AND DEMOCRATIC REVERSIBILITY 
Is there an existential threat to American democracy that can be found 
in such policy shifts?  We know that the answer was “yes” in the case of 1860 
with the onset of the Civil War.  In the case of 2016, however, where events 
are still playing out, one item worth considering on this point is the possibility 
for policy reversals in future elections.  For example, Ian Shapiro offers the 
insight from the democratic theory literature that vigorous electoral compe-
tition can be crucial in aiding the stability of a democratic system: the possi-
bility of reversible policy shifts, where losers may hold out hope of gaining 
the upper-hand in some future electoral competition, offers a strong incentive 
for them to stay invested in the democratic system even after suffering a 
crushing electoral loss.20 
Certainly, there is something within the focus on reversibility that pro-
vides some illumination on the calculation of southern secessionists in 1860.  
Carpenter has argued that southern regional angst surrounding its perceived 
status as an embattled numerical minority was a constant in the antebellum 
era and was not confined to just those years preceding the Civil War.21  Yet, 
there seems little question that this sense of threat or besiegement took on a 
much more dramatic and intense cast by 1860.  By that point, it was apparent 
that the South was not just a minority, but a “permanent and dwindling” 
one.22  Demographic shifts allowed for the possibility of a purely northern 
sectional candidate, like Lincoln, to win the presidency without any electoral 
support from the South.23 
This demographic reality was coupled with the contemplated policy 
shifts previously discussed, as Southerners became increasingly conscious of 
the intensity of anti-slavery sentiment.  That is, the sense of regional embat-
tlement by the South was linked to the fact that, beyond its demographic lia-
bilities, criticisms of slavery were increasingly made in moral—as opposed 
to pragmatic—terms in the decades leading up to the Civil War.24  And fi-
nally, there was also a perception in the South that the system of slavery was 
                                                          
Parker & David E. Sanger, Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary Clinton’s Missing Emails, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-
clinton-emails.html.  
 20.  IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 88, 90 (2003). 
 21.  JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789–1861: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 24–29 (1930). 
 22.  POTTER, supra note 1, at 475–76. 
 23.  MAURY KLEIN, DAYS OF DEFIANCE: SUMTER, SECESSION, AND THE COMING OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 29 (1999); see also AVERY O. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM 
1848–1861, at 6 (1953). 
 24.  CRAVEN, supra note 23, at 19–20, 394–95; POTTER, supra note 1, at 400, 469, 476–78; 
CHARLES S. SYDNOR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM 1819–1848, at 332, 335–
39 (1948). 
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fragile and incapable of weathering major disruptions.  All of these concerns 
only grew with the election of Lincoln, and gave rise to a perception among 
many Southerners that an existential threat to slavery was at hand.25  As Da-
vid Potter stated, 
 If the government of the United States should pass into the con-
trol of opponents of slavery, as it seemed about to do in 1860, the 
South had realistic reason to fear the consequences, not so much 
because of legislation which the dominant party might adopt, but 
because the monolithic, closed system of social and intellectual ar-
rangements upon which the South relied for the perpetuation of 
slavery might be disrupted.  Once Lincoln was in office, he could 
appoint Republican judges, marshals, customs collectors, and post-
masters in the South.  This would strike a heavy blow at the mys-
tique of planter control which had been vital to the maintenance of 
the southern system. . . . Lincoln might appoint abolitionists or 
even free Negroes to public office in the South.  And even if he did 
not do this, the new Republican postmasters would refuse to censor 
the mails or to burn abolitionist papers. . . . For a slave system vi-
tally dependent upon the solidarity of the whites, this loomed as a 
frightful menace.26 
If our focus were on the interplay between the potential for democratic 
reversibility and democratic stability, how might we estimate the potential 
for reversing the policy consequences of a Trump presidency?  If the threats 
of autocracy and fascism that commentators have raised come to fruition, this 
would certainly indicate an irreversibility to President Trump’s policy 
choices—and make this an easy question to answer since by definition this 
would pose an existential threat to American democracy.  The answer would 
be similar if we contemplated other obviously irreversible presidential ac-
tions such as, say, the initiation of massive, global nuclear conflict by Trump.  
But let us consider the tougher question of whether threats to American de-
mocracy may reside in either transformative changes in discrete policy areas 
like immigration or within some of President Trump’s problematic character 
traits (that do not necessarily culminate in his becoming a dictator). 
Ultimately, demographic trends in the United States do not suggest a 
clear and easy path for indefinite dominance by a Trump coalition.  To be 
sure, he performed extraordinarily well in 2016 by cobbling together a coali-
tion of voters that many did not anticipate.  Nate Cohn notes that there was a 
systemic overestimation in post-2012 election polling of the number of well-
                                                          
 25.  CLEMENT EATON, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY 20 (1954); CRAVEN, su-
pra note 23, at 359, 391; GEORGE C. RABLE, THE CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC: A REVOLUTION 
AGAINST POLITICS 27 (1994). 
 26.  POTTER, supra note 1, at 477–78. 
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educated and nonwhite voters, while there was also an underestimation of the 
number of white, working-class voters over the age of forty-five.27  And with 
respect to the 2016 election itself, a great deal of commentary has focused on 
the importance of rural and/or white working-class voters for Trump’s vic-
tory, due to economic anxieties among these constituencies.28 
Still, this hardly implies that the Democrats of 2016 are in the same 
hopeless posture that Southern Democrats contemplated in 1860.  The demo-
graphic realities of the present day do not favor the interests of a Republican 
coalition based upon appealing to white voters and alienating minority voters, 
even if this has proven to be a more powerful and durable coalition than many 
anticipated.29  Far from having to contemplate the possibility of irreversible 
policies entrenched by inescapable demographic trends, time is on the side 
of present-day progressives.  Indeed, although President Obama is hardly a 
neutral observer or commentator on the topic, the sensibility that Democratic 
Party policy gains may yet be maintained during a Trump presidency, and 
advanced after a Trump presidency, was present within the public statements 
of Obama in the aftermath of the 2016 election.30  With this in mind, perhaps 
the better analogue for the 1860 Democrats in the present-day—at least with 
respect to this reversibility question—are not the 2016 Democrats, but rather 
the 2016 Republicans. 
In sum, at least on this dimension of reversibility and democratic stabil-
ity, the implications of the 2016 election and the 1860 election run in different 
directions for the losers in those respective contests.  In 2016, we had a pres-
idential election where the besieged minority pulled out a surprising victory, 
and the perceived demographic winner of the future suffered a setback.  One 
might argue that the type of election we saw in 2016 is precisely the kind of 
thing that might be stabilizing, rather than destabilizing, for a polity that has 
to continue to grapple with deep pluralism. 
                                                          
 27.  Nate Cohn, Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/why-trump-won-working-class-whites.html. 
 28.  Id.; Nate Cohn & Toni Monkovic, How Did Donald Trump Win Over So Many Obama 
Voters?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/upshot/how-did-trump-
win-over-so-many-obama-voters.html; Danielle Kurtzleben, Rural Voters Played a Big Part in 
Helping Trump Defeat Clinton, NPR (Nov. 14, 2016, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/14/501737150/rural-voters-played-a-big-part-in-helping-trump-de-
feat-clinton; Rich Morin, Behind Trump’s Win in Rural White America: Women Joined Men in 
Backing Him, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/17/behind-trumps-win-in-rural-white-america-women-joined-men-in-backing-him/.  
 29.  David Leonhardt, Opinion, Clinton’s Substantial Popular-Vote Win, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/opinion/clintons-substantial-popular-vote-win.html. 
 30.  David Remnick, It Happened Here, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 2016, at 62, 64. 
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III.  STRUCTURES OF COMMONALITY 
If we move beyond the dimension of reversibility, where the 2016 elec-
tion presents tamer implications for the possible destabilization of American 
democracy relative to conditions in 1860, there is a second dimension in 
which conditions in the present appear to overlap a little more with those in 
1860: namely, the health and vitality of structures of commonality that bridge 
the fault lines between established and opposing constituencies.  It seems rel-
atively uncontroversial to assert that American democracy is aided, en-
hanced, and stabilized when there are institutional and social structures in 
existence that allow for engagement to occur between opposing social groups 
and constituencies.  Deep pluralism is inevitable in a polity as large as the 
United States, but in order for differences to be contained within the Ameri-
can polity, this nation has undoubtedly been aided in its past by the presence 
of structures that could mediate these differences, or redirect them in such a 
way that other fault lines could emerge to facilitate cross-cutting cleavages.  
It is hard to see how the American democratic system could persist without 
the ability to periodically contain these conflicts, and allow opposing constit-
uencies to engage outside or beyond the terms of deeply settled and poten-
tially destabilizing societal fault lines. 
Clement Eaton noted that by 1860, some of the most significant cross-
sectional institutions in American life had been undermined—further accen-
tuating the psychological and cultural distinctions between North and South.  
As he stated, 
 By 1860–1861 many invisible bonds, which held the Union to-
gether, had snapped—one by one.  The division of the Methodist 
and Baptist churches in 1844–1845 over the slavery question was 
prophetic of a political split.  The great Whig party which had up-
held the national idea so strongly had disintegrated; Southern stu-
dents attending Northern colleges had returned home; and North-
ern magazines and newspapers were being boycotted in the South.  
As Carl Russell Fish has observed, “The Democratic party, the Ro-
man Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church, the American Medi-
cal Association, and the Constitution were among the few ties that 
had not snapped.”31 
All of this culminated in the election of Lincoln, where David Potter 
notes, part of the surprise felt by the South upon his election was rooted in 
the fact that the nation’s political system had, to a significant extent, essen-
tially split by that point: 
                                                          
 31.  EATON, supra note 25, at 11–12 (quoting CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
WAR: AN INTERPRETATION 11 (1937)). 
 300 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:291 
 
When Lincoln was elected, the result came to the South as a much 
greater shock than it would have if Republican speakers, or even 
Lincoln himself, had been ranging up and down and back and forth 
throughout the South, asking the voters to trust him.  The Republi-
cans would have had nothing to gain from such a campaign, and 
southerners would never have permitted it, but the point is that the 
voters of the South were naturally prepared to believe the worst of 
a candidate when most of them had never seen even one of his sup-
porters, much less the man himself, and when his party did not even 
seek their support.  In fact, the American party system had ceased 
to operate in a nationwide context.32 
It is difficult to claim that segmentation in the American polity of the 
present is anything remotely as extreme as these conditions in 1860.  There 
is a not-insignificant degree of segmentation in 2016 premised upon geogra-
phy and geographic identity, as evidenced by the state-by-state vote tallies.  
The distinctiveness of the West Coast was a point of discussion after the elec-
tion, for example,33 and (sometimes) tongue-in-cheek demands for state se-
cession also appeared after the election.34  Indeed, imaginings of multiple, 
separate, and more homogeneously liberal and conservative republics within 
the United States was hardly an exercise spawned by Trump’s election.  In 
2009, while discussing the Tea Party, Hendrik Hertzberg offered just such a 
vision of a United States separated from the states that made up the old Con-
federacy (the “Federated States”): 
 For the old country [the remaining states of the United States], 
the benefits would be obvious.  A more intimately sized Congress 
would briskly enact sensible gun control, universal health insur-
ance, and ample support for the arts, the humanities, and the sci-
ences. . . .  The Federated States, meanwhile, could get on with the 
business of protecting the sanctity of marriage, mandating orga-
nized prayer sessions and the teaching of creationism in schools, 
and giving the theory that eliminating taxes increases government 
revenues a fair test. . . .  But the greatest benefit would be psycho-
logical: freed from the condescension of metropolitan élites and 
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Hollywood degenerates, the new country could tap its dormant cre-
ativity and develop a truly distinctive Way of Life.35 
Still, it is hard to claim that this geographic segmentation is nearly as 
stark as what was present in 1860.  Trump, after all, still won 31.5% of the 
votes in California, or 4,483,810 votes.36  The differing regional segments of 
modern America are not as geographically uniform, and the significance of 
geographic segmentation is helpfully constrained by the fact that it is only 
one of several types of diversity that is prominent in the present-day. 
And yet, even if it may be difficult to say that the forms of segmentation 
in the present-day are perfectly comparable to those in 1860, one facet of our 
national culture may provide a possible analogue for the break-down of 
cross-sectional institutions prior to the Civil War.  In light of the growing 
prevalence of fake news, the echo-chamber nature of communities con-
structed by ideologically-influenced media, and the growing prominence of 
individually-tailored interactions on social media in our lives, there has been 
increasing public commentary upon the fact that pluralism and segmentation 
has seemingly come to affect even the very facts and terms that make up the 
foundation of a public discourse. 
In his post-election interview with President Obama, David Remnick 
quotes the former in stating this on the nature of modern media: 
 The new media ecosystem “means everything is true and nothing 
is true,” Obama told me later.  “An explanation of climate change 
from a Nobel Prize-winning physicist looks exactly the same on 
your Facebook page as the denial of climate change by somebody 
on the Koch brothers’ payroll.  And the capacity to disseminate 
misinformation, wild conspiracy theories, to paint the opposition 
in wildly negative light without any rebuttal—that has accelerated 
in ways that much more sharply polarize the electorate and make 
it very difficult to have a common conversation.” 
President Obama maintained that the new media ecosystem marked a 
decisive change from previous political eras.  “Ideally, in a democracy, eve-
rybody would agree that climate change is the consequence of man-made be-
havior, because that’s what ninety-nine per cent of scientists tell us,” he said.  
Continuing, President Obama stated,  
And then we would have a debate about how to fix it.  That’s how, 
in the seventies, eighties, and nineties, you had Republicans sup-
porting the Clean Air Act and you had a market-based fix for acid 
rain rather than a command-and-control approach.  So you’d argue 
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about means, but there was a baseline of facts that we could all 
work off of.  And now we just don’t have that.37 
In a similar vein, in his commentary on both campus debates surround-
ing controversial speech and Donald Trump, Nathan Heller questioned what 
remains of societal consensus or convergence even with respect to simple 
statements of fact.  As he mentioned with respect to Donald Trump: 
 In a climate where common language is not held accountable to 
common meaning, “taking a stand” becomes a mostly theatrical 
exercise.  Trump, the candidate, is all about “taking a stand,” an-
nouncing values and setting trajectories.  That little seems to be 
backed by fixed meaning or process isn’t, as some observers claim, 
a quirk of his campaign. . . .  Trumpism is successful because it 
leverages a disconnect among language, meaning, and process 
that’s deep-set in our national life.  He can say anything these 
days—because the rest of us can, too.38 
Thus, even if we may still have institutional and social structures within 
which the pluralism of American society could theoretically be channeled—
whether they be local institutions like schools, national institutions like the 
Democratic and Republican parties, or web-based venues such as social me-
dia or chat forums—these structures would be incapable of bridging plurality 
if, at a more foundational level, the polity is bereft of the basic tools needed 
for such engagement.  Such tools would include widespread agreement upon 
basic terminology or something approaching baseline “facts.”  On this di-
mension then—the presence or absence of the structures and tools needed for 
engagement across lines of societal division—this form of hyper-pluralism 
in our public discourse in the present day could be analogized to the break-
down of cross-regional institutional structures in the years preceding the Civil 
War. 
IV.  REORIENTING THE TERMS OF CONFLICT 
Within the preceding two Sections, I have proceeded with some under-
lying assumptions about the nature of threats to American democracy.  I have 
assumed that deep lines of division existing in American society may be more 
or less a fact of life, and that threats to American democracy reside in the 
greater or lesser efficacy of political, institutional, and social mechanisms in 
managing pluralism.  The existence of cross-cutting cleavages and mecha-
nisms for engagement across lines of difference would seem to minimize 
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these threats, while the existence of permanent, entrenched (though still po-
litically effective) minorities, irreversible and contentious policy shifts, and 
the absence of mechanisms for common engagement would seem to enhance 
those threats. 
In this concluding Section, however, I approach these questions through 
a somewhat different lens and with a different set of starting presumptions: 
even if a state of pluralism may be inescapable in as large and diverse a so-
ciety as ours, it is obviously not the case that the particular fault lines of dif-
ference at any moment in time will necessarily remain as they are.  This is 
another lesson to be drawn from the 1860 election too, since both the aboli-
tion of slavery and the question of a state’s right to secede are no longer 
deeply contested issues in present-day America.  Similarly, one may look 
over the span of legal developments on race, gender, and sexual orientation 
in the last seventy years to see stable and seemingly permanent changes in 
legal principle, institutional development, and public opinion on certain is-
sues within those areas—thereby leading to the terrain of major agreement 
and major points of disagreement changing, to varying degrees, over time.  
In other words, we do see cases of secular political developments in Ameri-
can history.39 
One may thus ponder the question of threats to American democracy 
with this slightly different focus in mind: might the threats of disinvested 
perpetual losers and hyper-pluralism be addressed not by better or worse 
management of existing plurality, but by the mitigation of threat through the 
reorientation of the major fault lines of difference—via inspired political 
leadership, a new wave of social movements, or a rejuvenated political party 
structure?  That is, might the polity be saved by a reshuffling and replacement 
of the major policy issues that define the major divergences in American pol-
itics? 
To be sure, if anything, President Trump’s temperament and the absence 
of any evidence of his ability to mature into a great statesman suggest that no 
such solution is imminent during his presidency.  If anything, President 
Trump seems more likely to exacerbate existing threats to America, while 
introducing significant new ones.  But the question is worth pondering here 
for a few reasons.  First, it is prompted by our focus on the 1860 election.  At 
its core, what the Civil War encompassed was the clash of opposing values—
slavery and anti-slavery—where no set of institutional arrangements and no 
type of compromise could have resolved the conflict in a painless way.  As 
Avery O. Craven has stated, 
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Neither the North nor the South could yield its position because 
slavery had come to symbolize values in each of their social-eco-
nomic structures for which men fight and die but which they do not 
give up or compromise.  These values had been emphasized and 
reinforced by two decades of emotional strife, name-calling, and 
self-justification.  Right and wrong, justice and injustice were in 
conflict.  The destiny of mankind was at stake.40 
One vision ultimately won out, however, and the polity then moved on 
to grapple with other political conflicts.  Of course, economic and race issues 
persisted after the Civil War, so this is not to claim that there were no conti-
nuities from the antebellum era into the Reconstruction era.  That said, it is 
also true that the antebellum universe, and the threat to American democracy 
present within it, did not live on past the Civil War. 
Second, a similar aspiration to reorient the major terms of political de-
bate has very notably been articulated by members of the Republican Party’s 
“rejectionist wing,” including the Freedom Caucus, in recent years: namely, 
that a shock to the system, posed by uncompromising position-taking, would 
help to address the fundamental threats and problems that they feel exist in 
present-day America.41  Presumably, those Republicans would view their ac-
tions as being driven by a desire to—on the other side of their efforts—help-
fully redraw the terms of everyday or common-place political debate within 
a more conservative polity. 
And finally, for those on the more progressive end of the political spec-
trum, one of our recent presidents has, in a sense, staked his own political 
identity around this question of reorienting present-day political conflicts, al-
beit in a complicated way.  President Obama has been admirably (or frustrat-
ingly) insistent on a politics of compromise and accommodation for a sub-
stantial portion of his political career.  One might plausibly see this aspiration 
as Obama’s own vision of how the fault lines of American politics might be 
reoriented.  Thus, in his dramatic introduction to a national political audience 
at the Democratic Party National Convention in 2004, he stated in his speech: 
[T]here’s not a liberal America and a conservative America; 
there’s the United States of America.  There’s not a black America 
and white America and Latino America and Asian America; 
there’s the United States of America.  The pundits, the pundits like 
to slice and dice our country into red states and blue States: red 
states for Republicans, blue States for Democrats.  But I’ve got 
news for them, too.  We worship an awesome God in the blue 
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states, and we don’t like federal agents poking around our libraries 
in the red states. 
 . . . . 
 We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and 
stripes, all of us defending the United States of America.  In the 
end, that’s what this election is about.  Do we participate in a poli-
tics of cynicism, or do we participate in a politics of hope?42 
As many commentators have noted, President Obama’s strong inclina-
tion to search for agreement and compromise has been an enduring feature 
of his personality and political philosophy.  David Remnick noted that 
Obama’s inclination to consensus was well-noted among his law school 
classmates: “Everyone remembers Obama in much the same way: that he 
held generally progressive views on the political and racial controversies on 
campus, but never took the lead.  He always used language of reconciliation 
rather than of insistence.”43  And indeed, as he wrote in The Audacity of Hope, 
President Obama extended this same sense of value-humility (to a degree) to 
his own general insistence on compromise and consensus-seeking.44  As he 
wrote with respect to Lincoln: 
 That self-awareness, that humility, led Lincoln to advance his 
principles through the framework of our democracy, through 
speeches and debate, through the reasoned arguments that might 
appeal to the better angels of our nature. . . .  The blood of slaves 
reminds us that our pragmatism can sometimes be moral coward-
ice.  Lincoln, and those buried at Gettysburg, remind us that we 
should pursue our own absolute truths only if we acknowledge that 
there may be a terrible price to pay.45 
And yet, after two terms as president, it also seems abundantly clear that 
President Obama’s aspirations to reorient the modern fault-lines of disagree-
ment through a post-partisan politics has clearly failed.  He stated as much in 
his State of the Union address in 2016.46  Clearly then, if the divisions of 
present-day pluralism are to be redrawn or reoriented, this will have to be 
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done through the articulation of a national vision that is more insistent than 
the vision articulated by Obama—at least for a significant portion of his pres-
idency—on specific values, specific policies, and specific constituencies that 
must be prioritized over others.  To the extent that such a reimagining, backed 
by broad democratic support, is plausible, any present-day threats to Ameri-
can democracy may be mitigated.  To the extent that such a reimagining is 
simply out of reach, as it was in 1860, we may accordingly worry even more 
about these threats. 
Is such a reimagining possible?  If so, what are the likely alternatives?  
Trumpism, at least for the moment, seems unlikely to provide much hope.  
Regardless of one’s political persuasion, it is not clear that a coherent Trump 
political philosophy will emerge anytime soon that is capable of generating 
a lasting cohesion across the constituencies encompassed within the Repub-
lican Party, much less across some constituencies outside the Republican 
Party. 
With respect to the Democratic Party, there are no obvious answers ei-
ther.  Much post-election commentary focused on the Democrats has been 
consumed with the debate over whether that party would be better served to 
continue on with its emphasis on “identity liberalism,” or whether the focus 
on identity should be abandoned in favor of broad-based economic themes.47  
The appeal of the latter is supported by the prominent role that white work-
ing-class voters in the Midwest played as a crucial swing constituency for 
President Trump.48 
Though somewhat distinct, shades of this debate between identity liber-
alism and economic-based liberalism have carried over to evaluations of Hil-
lary Clinton, who has been characterized as contrasting with President 
Obama’s orientation toward consensus building and compromise.  This point 
of distinction has been used to suggest that Clinton ran into problems pre-
cisely because she was less conciliatory to the rural, working-class white vot-
ers who proved to be an important part of the Trump coalition.  About a 
month prior to the election, Larissa MacFarquhar wrote about the appeal of 
then-candidate Trump in a West Virginia County, and drew this comparison 
between Obama and Clinton: 
[A]lthough Obama’s and Clinton’s immigration policies are pretty 
similar, the way they talk about the subject is quite different.  In a 
speech at the end of last year, Clinton suggested that wariness of 
immigrants was a sign of bad character. 
 . . . . 
                                                          
 47.  For a notable comment that was critical of the Democratic Party’s emphasis on identity 
liberalism, see Mark Lilla, Opinion, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html. 
 48.  See id. 
 2017] THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC STABILITY 307 
 
 When Obama gave a speech on immigration in the fall of 2014, 
he spoke first about America’s border—how he had secured it, and 
how illegal crossings had been cut by more than half.  When he 
spoke about people who opposed his policies, he said he under-
stood them.  
 . . . . 
 Of course, Obama doesn’t have to prove his anti-racist bona fides 
in the same way that Clinton does.  But it is also Obama’s style to 
talk like this.  He likes to reconcile, to draw people in, to minimize 
the differences between them.  Clinton, on the other hand, always 
describes herself as a fighter, and it is her style to draw sharp lines 
between right and wrong—between the people who are being op-
pressed and the people doing the oppressing.  This style can make 
it sound as though she thinks people who disagree with her on im-
migration are probably racists.49 
In a similar vein, Nate Cohn drew a similar comparison after the elec-
tion: 
 One other thing: Both Trump and Obama made white working-
class voters feel a little better about racial anxiety. 
 They obviously did it in very different ways. 
 But I’d say that Obama made a lot of voters feel good, even 
proud, about supporting an African-American. 
 Trump made them feel O.K. about their “politically incorrect” 
reservations about diversity, crime and immigration. 
 Clinton did something very bold that I don’t think she got very 
much credit for: She challenged many white Americans to question 
implicit bias, and revived criminal justice as an issue.  That may 
have been a bridge too far.50 
Not surprisingly, Hillary Clinton’s approach has been subject to critique 
precisely because she lost the election.  And the reality of a Democratic Party 
loss to as flawed a candidate as Donald Trump is certainly sufficient grounds 
for some self-evaluation about the merits and demerits of identity-based 
themes as part of the Party’s vision. 
Still, it seems problematic to me to call for a categorical de-emphasis of 
identity themes on both pragmatic and substantive grounds.  With respect to 
the pragmatic, Hillary Clinton still won close to 2.9 million votes more than 
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Donald Trump nationwide,51 and the Democrats do have demographic ad-
vantages in their favor.  With respect to the substantive, I am also inclined to 
believe that there are elements of structural inequality in American society 
that are going to be impossible to tackle and eventually address without an 
identity politics capable of at least naming them, and pressing for their inclu-
sion in public discourse.52 
More to the point for my argument, however, as difficult as it may be to 
imagine right now what the right message would be for a reinvigorated and 
electorally successful Democratic coalition, I do think that the potential for a 
reimagining of fault lines in American politics are much more plausible in 
2016 than they were in 1860.  I would speculate that if a new governing re-
gime from the left is ever able to emerge to decisively take hold of the federal 
government again, themes about structural equality and inequality will be a 
part of that regime’s core commitments.  I also suspect that these themes will 
have to be broad enough to encompass not just many of the established 
themes within present-day identity liberalism, but will also be capable of cap-
turing the structural disadvantages faced by white-working class voters who 
responded to economic and cultural anxieties in 2016 by voting for Trump.53 
As to which sub-themes of equality will be the focus—whether racial, 
economic, gender, sexual orientation—and, more importantly, how those 
sub-themes will be reconciled or prioritized remains to be seen.  But one 
could see that in 1860, the centrality of slavery to American democracy in its 
social, economic, and political consequences, combined with the nature of 
opposition to slavery in the non-slave states, ensured that there was almost 
no way the topic of conversation was going to change anytime soon.  The 
possibilities for talented politicians to put forth compelling new national nar-
ratives, and for reenergized or reimagined political parties to emerge, seem 
much more expansive in 2016 relative to conditions in 1860.  As such, pre-
sent-day political conditions diverge in a more hopeful manner on this point 
from conditions after the 1860 election. 
Ultimately, at least on the points discussed in this Essay, it is hard to see 
any kind of threat to American democracy within the 2016 election compa-
rable to that present in 1860—though admittedly, I have set the bar pretty 
high by choosing the latter election as my point of comparison.  Unlike the 
                                                          
 51.  Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 
5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-fi-
nal-count/. 
 52.  See Khalil Gibran Muhammad, No Racial Barrier Left to Break (Except All of Them), N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/opinion/sunday/president-obama-
martin-luther-king-racial-barrier.html. 
 53.  On the topic of how we might conceptualize the “victimhood” felt by white Tea Party 
supporters, see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND 215–17, 232–33 
(2016).  
 2017] THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC STABILITY 309 
 
case of Southern Democrats in 1860, the electoral losers in 2016 are not 
weighed down with the fear of being a permanent and besieged minority.  I 
have argued that one of the more troubling aspects of contemporary politics 
may be rooted in the potential for societal cleavages to become even more 
entrenched as our public discourse becomes increasingly fragmented over 
time.  Still, as I noted in the last section, even this fear may ultimately be 
mitigated if new presidents, new social movements, and new political parties 
are able to reorient the major fault lines of difference in American politics.  I 
don’t know that this is likely to happen anytime soon, but compared to con-
ditions in 1860, the conditions in 2016 appear much more favorable to the 
occurrence of such a shift. 
